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Infl ation Risk?
Infl ation is on the rise again in the industrialised world. This has led to fears of a sustained 
surge in infl ation. This article argues that while such fears may make sense in the US, they do 
not in the eurozone, where the monetary-fi scal policy mix has been much less expansionary 
than in the US. The fear expressed by some that the monetary overhang from the large 
injections of liquidity through quantitative easing might lead to infl ation in the eurozone does 
not stand up to scrutiny either. The conclusion offers some observations on the monetary 
operating procedures in the ECB. It argues that in the future, when interest rates rise again, 
the ECB risks transferring all (and even more) of its profi ts to the banking system. This article 
proposes a way to avoid this unacceptable outcome.
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Infl ation is on the rise again in the industrialised world. 
In the US, the infl ation rate reached 5.4% in June 2021; 
in the eurozone infl ation was estimated to be 1.9% in the 
same month. Should we worry about this surge in infl a-
tion? In order to answer this question, one must answer 
a preliminary one: What are the causes of this increase in 
infl ation?
The short answer is that it has everything to do with the 
economic recovery from the pandemic that hit the world 
in 2020. This recovery has been made possible by two 
things: the release of excess savings accumulated dur-
ing 2020 and strong expansionary fi scal and monetary 
policies, especially in the US, where  the mix of fi scal 
and monetary policy has been extraordinarily expansion-
ary. While US GDP growth declined by 5.8% in 2020, the 
budget defi cit increased by 10.7% of GDP. Thus, for every 
1% decline in GDP, the US fi scal authorities allowed the 
budget defi cit to increase by almost 2% of GDP. This 
compares with a decline in eurozone GDP of 7.5% and an 
increase in the budget defi cit of 6.4%. In other words, for 
every 1% decline in GDP in the eurozone, fi scal authorities 
allowed the budget defi cit to increase by less than 1% of 
GDP. Thus, it appears that the fi scal expansion was about 
twice as strong in the US compared to the eurozone.
A similar story emerges from monetary policies. Both 
the US Fed and the ECB intensifi ed their asset purchas-
es since the start of the pandemic, thereby fl ooding the 
markets with liquidity. But again, the amount of asset 
purchases was signifi cantly higher in the US than in the 
eurozone. Since January 2020, the US Fed bought ap-
proximately $2.6 trillion in government securities, about 
twice the amount bought by the ECB, €1.3 trillion, thereby 
increasing the amount of liquidity in the US signifi cantly 
relative to the eurozone.
It appears that since the start of the pandemic, monetary 
and fi scal policies have been expansionary in both the 
US and the eurozone, but that the intensity of this expan-
sion has been much higher in the former. This has led 
some to argue (e.g. Summers, 2021; Blanchard, 2021) 
that the US fi scal-monetary policy mix is excessive and 
exceeds the capacity of the economy to absorb it without 
major price increases. This probably explains why the 
surge in infl ation is much higher in the US than in the eu-
rozone. I conclude from this that while the risk of infl ation 
is real in the US, it is much less so in the eurozone, where 
monetary and fi scal expansion does not appear to be hit-
ting capacity constraints in the economy.
Diehard monetarists will probably object to this conclu-
sion. Quantitative easing (QE) performed by the ECB 
since 2015 has created a monetary overhang. Does this 
overhang not create a risk for future infl ation? Did Milton 
Friedman not teach us that infl ation is always and every-
where a monetary phenomenon ? The fact is that the QE 
programme of the ECB has led to a surge in the money 
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stock in the eurozone. This in the end will lead to a surge 
in infl ation, according to this monetarist analysis.
Let us look at the numbers. This is done in Figures 1 and 
2. Figure 1 shows the evolution in time of infl ation and the 
growth rate of M3 in the eurozone. We observe fi rst that 
the relation between these two variables is weak. This is 
also confi rmed by Figure 2, which shows the same num-
bers in a scatter diagram, with M3 growth on the horizon-
tal axis and infl ation on the vertical one. A simple regres-
sion line, which is almost horizontal, shows that there is 
no signifi cant relation at all between money growth and 
infl ation. Of course, one might argue that this fi gure only 
measures the short-term relation between money growth 
and infl ation, while the monetarist theory tells us that this 
relation only holds in the long run. De Grauwe and Polan 
(2005) looked at the long-run relationship between mon-
ey growth and infl ation (over a 30-year period) for about 
100 countries and concluded that, except for countries 
experiencing hyperinfl ation, there is no signifi cant long-
run relation between money growth and infl ation.
Coming back to Figure 1, we observe two waves in the 
expansion of the money stock in the eurozone. There 
is the pre-fi nancial crisis wave of monetary expansion 
that reached yearly growth rates of more than 10% from 
2006 to 2008, and there is the post-2015 wave that led 
to increases in the money stock exceeding 10% in 2020. 
Both waves of monetary expansion that were sustained 
over fi ve years or more do not seem to have affected 
infl ation much (confi rming our previous observations). 
The pre-fi nancial crisis wave, however, teaches us that 
the risk was elsewhere, i.e. in the fi nancial markets. Un-
derlying the strong growth in M3 there was the surge in 
bank credit that fuelled real estate and other bubbles. 
Ultimately, this led to the banking crisis of 2007-08. Will 
history repeat itself?
From the preceding, I conclude that the risk of a signifi -
cant surge in infl ation in the eurozone appears to be limit-
ed. This contrasts with the US, where the risk appears to 
be more serious. However, the large expansion in liquid-
ity both in the US and in the eurozone creates potential 
risks in fi nancial markets. These might affect the future 
conduct of monetary policies.
At some point when infl ation returns to its normal level, 
central banks will have to raise interest rates. These in-
terest rate increases create two potential problems that 
may act as obstacles for these interest rate increases.
The fi rst one relates to the problem just identifi ed. An in-
terest rate increase may destabilise fi nancial markets, in 
particular the bond markets. Interest rate increases will 
lower bond prices and affect the balance sheets of many 
fi nancial institutions (banks, pension funds, insurance 
companies). Can such an increase in the interest rate be 
done in an orderly way that minimises the risks of a fi nan-
cial crisis? There is no easy answer to this question. The 
uncertainty about this may induce central banks to wait 
too long to raise interest rates.
The second obstacle derives from the way central banks 
conduct monetary policies. For about 20 years, ma-
jor central banks (including the Fed and the ECB) have 
switched to an operating system in which they remuner-
ate banks’ reserves held at the central bank. This means 
that when central banks have to raise the interest rate, it 
Figure 1
Infl ation and M3 growth rate in the eurozone
Source: European Central Bank. Source: European Central Bank.
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will affect their profi t and loss account. This effect will be 
particularly pronounced for the ECB. At the end of 2020, 
bank reserves held at the ECB amounted to a massive 
€3.5 trillion (mostly the result of the large bond purchase 
programmes of the ECB). A 1% increase in the interest 
rate means that the ECB will have to pay out €35 billion to 
the banks holding these reserves. Going back to normal 
implies that the short-term interest rate would probably 
increase to 2%, leading to interest payments to banks 
of €70 billion. This represents about three times the an-
nual profi ts recorded by the ECB, €10-€20 billion during 
1999-2017 (Chiacchio et al., 2018), and thus would lead 
to massive losses of that institution. This could make the 
ECB reluctant to raise interest rates when this becomes 
necessary.
There is no easy way out of this problem. One possibil-
ity would be for the ECB to massively sell government 
bonds again, thereby reducing bank reserves. This would 
not only raise long-term bond rates signifi cantly but, 
more importantly, it would imply that the government 
debt relief that is implicit when the ECB holds govern-
ment bonds on its balance sheet would be reversed. This 
would put new pressure on member states’ budgets, es-
pecially those with large outstanding debt levels. It could 
also trigger a new sovereign debt crisis.
My favourite solution to this conundrum would be for the 
central bank to return to the old operating procedure of 
not remunerating bank reserves. There is no good eco-
nomic argument why banks should be remunerated for 
holding liquid assets. Holders of banknotes are not re-
munerated either. The current operating procedure that 
pays bankers for holding liquid reserves will in normal 
times ensure that all (if not more) of the seigniorage gains 
that should go to the Treasury are actually transferred to 
fi nancial institutions. This is an unacceptable outcome. 
The old operating procedure together with the use of 
minimum reserve requirements can be made to work 
again (as it did in the past) and provide for a better tool to 
conduct monetary policies in normal times.
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